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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v,

:

SIXTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS
UNITED STATES CURRENCY,
Defendant and Appellant.

:

Case No. 950284-CA
Priority No. 15

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to §§ 78-2-2(3)(j) and
78-2a-3(2) (k) , Utah Code Annotated (1995); however, no docketing
statement as required by Rule 9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
has been filed in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. The threshold question presented by this appeal is whether
any issues have been properly preserved for appeal.

Issues not

raised below may not be raised for the first time on appeal, unless
the trial court has committed plain and harmful error.

James v.

Preston. 746 P. 2d 799 (Utah App. 1987); State v. Cook. 881 P. 2d
913 (Utah App. 1994).
2. If this court considers appeal from default judgment which
does not includes trial court's ruling on motion to set aside
judgment under Rule 60(b), the appeal should be limited to the

sufficiency of the claim upon which judgement is entered.

This

question is one of law which should reviewed for correctness. Ward
v. Richfield CitV, 798 P. 2d 757 (Utah 1990).
3.

Whether

the trial court

acted unreasonably

declination of further continuance in this matter.
should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

in its

This decision
Christenson v.

Jewkes. 761 P. 2d 1375 (Utah 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from entry of judgment by default from an
action brought under authority of the Utah Controlled Substance Act
for forfeiture of $16,000 in U.S. currency.
B.

Course of the Proceedings Below

A complaint for forfeiture of property was filed in the
Seventh Judicial District, Grand County on September 28, 1994
alleging the property seized on February 24, 1994 was subject to
forfeiture under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13. No responsive pleading
was filed with the court and no formal appearance by any interested
party was made.

Following two continuances, the matter was heard

on January 25, 1995. In support of its claim, plaintiff submitted
testimonial evidence and judgment of forfeiture was entered on
January 31, 1995. Appellant filed a notice of appeal simultaneous
to a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court.

That

motion was denied on April 5, 1995.
C.

Disposition of the trial court

Upon its review of the record which showed no responsive
2

pleading on file, and following submission of evidence by the
plaintiff in support of its claim, the trial court entered judgment
of forfeiture on January 31, 1995.

The trial court subsequently

heard a motion for relief from judgment which it denied on April 5,
1995.
D.

Statement of Facts
Asset

Forfeiture

in Utah

- There are several Utah

statutory provisions which demarcate the process and procedure of
asset

forfeiture

in

Utah,

including

§58-37-13

of

the

Utah

Controlled Substance Act. In drug-related cases, asset forfeiture
is a civil proceeding governed by specific procedural requirements
within the statute. Following the seizure of property, a complaint
is filed by the county attorney, which contains a description of
the property, the date of seizure, and the basis for forfeiture.
Notice of the action is served upon all known persons having an
interest in the property by various means of notice described in
the statute.

Any claimant or interested party shall file a

verified answer to the complaint within 20 days of service of
notice.

Thereafter, the trial court shall review the record.

If

an answer has been filed, the matter is set for hearing within 20
days.

If no answer is on file, the court allows the county

attorney to proceed with evidence
Thereafter,

the

court

determines

in support of the claim.
if

the property

should be

forfeited or returned and an order to that effect is entered.
The Case at Bar - The property subject to this action was
seized by Utah Highway Patrol following a traffic stop on February
3

24, 1994 in Grand County.

On September 28, 1994, Grand County

Attorney William L. Benge filed a complaint seeking forfeiture of
the property under the provisions of the Utah Controlled Substance
Act.

R. 1-4.

Notice of the complaint was served by mail on the

known interested parties, and by publication in conformity with the
statutory notice provisions.

R. 5-6.

No answer to the complaint

was ever filed with the court.
Prior to the January 25, 1995 hearing, the matter had been
continued twice.

According to the trial court's docket entries,

the first continuance was upon state's written motion due to
witness unavailability.

R.

7-9.

The second was made by the

written motion on December 6, and an order was entered continuing
the matter to January 25, 1995. R. 20-23. No claimant's response
was ever filed with the court, nor was any appearance of counsel on
behalf of any claimant filed.
On the day of the hearing, the trial judge acknowledged
receipt of a facsimile transmission which purported to be a motion
for continuance. R. 61-62 (The record also contains an unnumbered
series of documents which appear to be the faxed copy which shows
transmission time and date of January 23, 1995 at 16:28 PST.)
Because no one had appeared on behalf of the claimant and the
purported motion did not conform with rules of civil procedure,
upon oral motion of the county attorney the motion was stricken.
R.

62. No other pleading appears in the record prior to entry of

judgment.
At the hearing, Trooper Darrel Mecam testified in support of
4

the claim and basis for seizure and forfeiture in this case.
62-68.

He testified that on February 24, 1994 he effected a

traffic stop of a 1988 Hyundai for speeding.
search

R.

of

the vehicle

revealed

a

secret

R. 63.
bumper

A consent
compartment

containing a Browning .22 caliber rifle, a quantity of cash and
marijuana residue.

R. 65-66.

The driver of the vehicle admitted

ownership of the discovered items.
positive as marijuana.

R. 67.

The marijuana residue tested

At the close of the evidence the

trial court found that the property was forfeitable as provided by
law.

R. 68.

1995.

R.

Judgment was entered by the court on January 31,

28-29.

Appellant

filed a motion for relief

exhibits in support.

R. 32-45.

from judgment with

The trial court docket record

shows this motion was denied on April 5, 1995. No appeal from that
ruling has been taken.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant asks this court to review the factual basis for the
judgment without first establishing his compliance with procedural
requirements in preserving his appeal.

In so doing, he seeks to

avert this court's application of a more stringent standard of
review so as to allow a second judicial analysis of the unrefuted
facts in this case.

Even upon such review, the claim is legally

sufficient to sustain the judgment and this appeal is groundless.
ARGUMENT
It is axiomatic that finality of judgments and judicial
economy are the cornerstones of justice, and while parties are
5

given access to a fair and impartial forum to resolves disputes,
that access is not unlimited.
(Utah 1992) .

Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P. 2d 315

It is likewise fundamental that no appeal may be

taken from any judgment upon issues not properly preserved. James
v. Preston, 746 P. 2d 799 (Utah App. 1987) .

In this matter,

Appellant seeks to circumvent the rules of civil and appellate
procedure in order to re-try groundless issues before this court.
POINT I
Failure to appeal the denial of the motion to set aside
judgement precludes inquiry into the basis for judgment.
In Utah, appeal may be taken from a trial court's ruling on a
motion

for

relief

from

Procedure, Rule 60(b).

judgment

under Utah

Rules

of

Civil

[hereinafter 60(b) motion] Birch v. Birch,

771 P. 2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989) . Many of Utah's neighboring states
also allow an appeal from the denial of a motion to set aside
default judgment.

United Bank of Boulder, N.A. v. Buchanan, 836

P.2d 473 (Colo. App. 1992); Dexter v. O'Neal, 649 P. 2d 680 (Wyo.
1982);

Apache East, Inc. v. Means, 601 P. 2d 615 (Ariz. App.

1979); contra

Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co. 812 P.2d 350 (Nev.

1991).
A Utah trial court's ruling on a 60(b) motion will not be
reversed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion.

Miller v.

Brocksmith, 825 P. 2d 690 (Utah App* 1992); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.
2d 92 (Utah 1986).

In this instance, Appellant seeks review of the

underlying facts and concomitant findings of the trial court
without regard for its determination of the diligence or merits of
his claim.

In effect, he asks this court to ignore the trial
6

court's determination that there was no valid reason to set aside
the judgment, without first establishing the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to do so.

By his default Appellant has

conceded the facts alleged; therefore, absent an appeal from the
60 (b) motion, Appellant should not be entitled to a review of
facts, and his appeal should be dismissed as to those issues.
Likewise, no objection to the trial court's findings of fact was
ever raised below, either post-judgment or in the motion for relief
under Rule 60(b).
While no Utah precedent has decided the precise issue of
a factual appeal from default which did not include the 60(b)
motion, some jurisdictions disfavor any direct appeal from default
judgments.

Dennison

v.

Doreen,

573

P.2d

1242

(Or

L978);

Industrial Commission v. Parise, 478 P. 2d 137 (Ariz. App. 1970),
The rational behind such prohibition recognizes the balance which
must be struck between fairness and finality.

See Vonsmith v.

Vonsmith, 666 S.W. 2d 424 (Mo. 1984).
POINT II
Direct appeal from default judgment is limited to whether
the claim is sufficient to support the judgment.
If Appellant's failure to appeal from the trial court's ruling
on the 60(b) motion does not preclude consideration of his direct
appeal, the scope of that review should be limited.

Direct appeal

from a default judgment may only reach the narrow question of
whether the trial court erred as a matter of law granting judgment
on the claim.

Ward v. Richfield City. 798 P. 2d 757 (Utah 1990)

By his non-appearance, Appellant acquiesced to the allegation of
7

the complaint and is limited to review of the legal sufficiency of
the claim for relief sought by the pleading.

This approach is

likewise supported by other jurisdictions. Cockerham v. Zikratch.
619 P. 2d 739 (Ariz. 1980); Raineesh Foundation International v.
McGreer, 734 P. 2d 871 (Or. 1987), rev, on other grounds 737 P. 2d
593(Or. 1987).

In other words, appellate review should not go

beyond the question of whether the complaint states a valid claim.
In this case, Appellant has not raised nor contested the validity
of the complaint.

Failure to do so precludes further judicial

scrutiny of the proceedings below, absent an adequate objection
which preserves other issues for appeal. James v. Preston, 746 P.
2d 799 (Utah App. 1987), accord State v. Cook, 881 P. 2d 913 (Utah
App. 1994) .
The State's position is further strengthened by the unique
nature of forfeiture proceedings under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13.
Subparagraph (9) (f) of that section allows for the submission of
evidence in support of the claim, unlike ordinary default judgment
entered upon the sufficiency of the pleading only. The trial court
received evidence that the property subject to forfeiture, in this
case $16,000 in currency, was found in close proximity to a
substance which field tested positive a marijuana. This unrefuted
evidence

also

becomes

part

of

the

claim,

and

is

therefore

impervious to challenge on appeal such as this.
The only question remaining is whether the trial court abused
its discretion based upon the totality of the claim that the
property was subject to forfeiture under Utah law.
8

In determining

the basis for forfeiture, the trial court was entitled to consider
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1) (g) (ii) which states:
"there is a rebuttable presumption that all money, coins,
and currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled
substances ... are forfeitable under this section; the
burden of proof is upon the claimants of the property to
rebut this presumption;11
There

is

no

question

that

marijuana

is

a

forfeitable

controlled substance, nor that the currency in this case was
discovered in proximity to the marijuana.

Therefore, even if it

were properly argued in this fashion, this appeal must fail because
the trial court did not err as a matter of law in determining the
property was subject to forfeiture, based upon the complaint and
the unrefuted evidence offered in support thereof.
POINT III
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
the unfiled request of a non-party to delay the proceedings
The Appellant baldly asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to allow continuance of the January 25
hearing. On January 25, there was no response to the complaint in
the court record, nor did anyone appear on behalf of the claimant.
In point of fact, no proper motion to continue could be made absent
a party at interest to make it.
Appellant cites the standard of review for such question as
"clearly erroneous" while relying on. authority which defines "abuse
of discretion".

The proper standard in reviewing a trial court's

decision regarding continuance is an abuse of discretion standard.
Christenson v. Jewkes, 7o± *>. 2d 1375 (Utah 1988) . In any event,
this argument fails for two reasons:

(1)

the issue is not

properly preserved for appeal, and (2) regardless of the standard
of review applied, the trial court acted properly in proceeding.
Absent the appearance of a party to file a written or oral
motion, and a subsequent ruling by the trial court, there is no
issue upon which to appeal. Here there is no party, no motion, no
ruling, and no objection for this court to consider. Secondly, the
courts failure to acknowledge a faxed transmission which did not
conform to Rule 10, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting
continuance of an action to which no responsive pleading had been
filed, by an attorney who had never filed an appearance in the
case, hardly rises to the level of error regardless of the standard
applied.

It is obvious that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in proceeding with the hearing on January 25, 1995.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Appellant's requested relief
from judgment in this case should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this z^7^

day of October, 1995.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

l$4=L ^^_
W. REED
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing APPELLEE'S RESPONSE BRIEF were mailed this
October, 1995, postage prepaid, to:

a-

day of

Michael H. Wray
Paul G. Amann
AMANN & WRAY
_ 9 Exchange Place, #900
( Salt Lakeflitv,Ut^h^-&4ill
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Addendum A
Copies of determinative statutory provisions

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS
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owner, operator, or agent in charge of the controlled premises consents in writing.
i$S7
6&37-11. District court jurisdiction to enjoin violations — Jury trial.
(1) The district courts of this state shall have jurisdiction in proceedings in accordance with the rules of
those courts to enjoin violations of this act.

(2) If an alleged violation of an injunction or restraining order issued under this section occurs, the
accused may demand a jury trial in accordance with
the rules of the district courts.
iS7i
58-37-12. Enforcement — Coordination and cooperation of federal and state agencies
— Powers.
The department and all law enforcement agencies
charged with enforcing this act shall cooperate with
federal and other state agencies in discharging their
responsibilities concerning traffic in controlled substances and in suppressing the abuse of controlled
substances. To this end, they are authorized to:
(1) Arrange for the exchange of information
between governmental officials concerning the
use and abuse of dangerous substances.
(2) Coordinate and cooperate in training programs in controlled substance law enforcement
at the local and state levels.
(3) Cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Utah Bureau of Investigation by establishing a centralized unit which will receive, catalog, file, and collect statistics, including records of drug-dependent persons and other controlled substance law
offenders within the state, and make the information available for federal, state, and local law
enforcement purposes.
(4) Conduct programs of eradication aimed at
destroying the wild or illicit growth of plant species from which controlled substances may be extracted.
1S71
68-37-13.

Property subject t o forfeiture — Sei-

zure —• Procedure.
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture and no
property right exists in them:
(a) all controlled substances which have been
manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this chapter;
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment
of any kind used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance in
violation of this chapter;
(c) all property used or intended for use as a
container for property described in Subsections
(lKa) and (1Kb);
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other
paraphernalia, not including capsules used with
health food supplements and herbs, used or intended for use to administer controlled substances in violation of this chapter,
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described in Subsections (lXa)
and (1Kb), except that:
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a
common carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited under this section unless it appears
that the owner or other person in charge of

58-37-13

the conveyance was a consenting party or
privy to violation of this chapter;
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason of any act or omission committed or omitted without the
owner's knowledge or consent; and
(in) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject
to a bona fide security interest is subject to
the interest of a secured party who could not
have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would or did take
place in the use of the conveyance;
(f) all books, records, and research, including
formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data used or intended for use in violation of this chapter;
(g) everything of value furnished or intended
to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this chapter, all proceeds
traceable to any violation of this chapter, and all
moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities
used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this chapter, but:
(i) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the holder of
the interest did not know of the act which
made the property subject to forfeiture, or
did not willingly consent to the act; and
(ii) there is a rebuttable presumption that
all money, coins, and currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled substances,
drug manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia, or to forfeitable records of the importation, manufacture, or distribution of
controlled substances are forfeitable under
this section; the burden of proof is upon
claimants of the property to rebut this presumption;
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in Section 58-3 7b-1, Imitation Controlled
Substances Act;
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real property of any kind
used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating, warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled substances in violation
of this chapter, except that:
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or interest in real
property is subject to the bona fide security
interest of a party who could not have known
in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a
violation would take place on the property;
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the holder of
the interest did not know of the act which
made the property subject to forfeiture, or
did not willingly consent to the act; and
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing,
or storage facility or interest in real property
may not be forfeited under this section unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on the property within a two-month
period total or exceed $1,000, or the street
value of any controlled substances found on
the premises at any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experienced
in controlled substances law enforcement
may testify to establish the street value of
the controlled substances for purposes of this
subsection; and

58-37-13

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

(j) any firearm, weapon, or ammunition carried or used during or in relation to a violation of
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, the Utah
Drug Paraphernalia Act, or the Utah Controlled
Substances Precursor Act or any firearm,
weapon, or ammunition kept or located witfcin
the proximity of controlled substances or other
property subject to forfeiture under any of those
acts.
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this chapter may be seized by any peace officer of this state
upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction
over the property. However, seizure without process
may be made when:
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or
search under a search warrant or an inspection
under an administrative inspection warrant;
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in
a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this chapter;
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is directly or indirectly
dangerous to health or safety; or
Id) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has been used or intended
to be used in violation of this chapter.
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2),
proceedings under Subsection (4) shall be instituted
promptly.
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is
not repleviable but is in custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the
orders and decrees of the court or the official having
jurisdiction. When property is seized under this chaptec, the appropriate pereon OT agency may.
(a) place the property under seal;
(b) remove the property to a place designated
by it or the warrant under which it was seized; or
(c) take custody of the property and remove it
to an appropriate location for disposition in accordance with law.
(5) All substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, distributed, or offered for distribution in violation of this act are contraband *nd
shall be seized and summarily forfeited to the state.
Similarly, all substances listed in Schedule I which
are seized or come into the possession of the state are
contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the
state if the owners are unknown.
(6) All species of plants from which controlled substances in Schedules I and II are derived which have
been planted or cultivated in violation of this chapter,
or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or
are wild growths, may be seized and summarily forfeited to the state.
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its
authorized agent, of any person in occupancy or in
control of land or premises upon which species of
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate license or proof that he is the holder of a
license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture of
the plants.
(8) When any property is forfeited under this chapter by a finding of the court that no person is entitled
to recover the property, it shall be deposited in the
custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all
property is as follows:
(a) The state may include in its complaint
seeking forfeiture, a request that the seizing
agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding
that the seizing agency is able to use the forfeited

90

property in the enforcement of controlled substances laws, the court having jurisdiction over
the case shall award the property to the seizing
agency. The seizing agency shall pay to the prosecuting agency the legal costs incurred in filing
and pursuing the forfeiture action. Property forfeited under this section may not be applied by
the court to costs or fines assessed against any
defendant in the case.
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no application, any state agency, bureau, county, or municipality, which demonstrates a need for specific
property or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall be given the property for use in enforcement of controlled substances laws upon the
payment of costs to the county attorney or, if
within a prosecution district, the district attorney for legal costs for filing and pursuing the
forfeiture and upon application for the property
to the director of the Division of Finance. The
application shall clearly set forth the need for the
property and the use to which the property will
be put.
(c) The director of the Division of Finance
shall review all applications for property submitted under Subsection (8Kb) and, if the seizing
agency makes no application, make a determination based on necessity and advisability as to
final disposition and shall notify the designated
applicant or seizing agency, where no application
is made, who may obtain the property upon payment of all costs to the appropriate department.
The Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse
the prosecuting agency or agencies for costs of
filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to
exceed the amount of the net proceeds received
for the sale of the property. Any proceeds remaining after payment shall be returned to the seizing agency or agencies.
(d) If no disposition is made upon an application under Subsection (8)(a) or (b), the director of
the Division of Finance shall dispose of the property by public bidding or as considered appropriate, by destruction. Proof of destruction shall be
upon oath of two officers or employees of the department having charge of the property, and verified by the director of the department or his designated agent.
(9) When any property is subject to forfeiture, a
determination for forfeiture to the state shall be
made as follows:
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation
shall be prepared by the county attorney, or if
within a prosecution district, the district attorney where the property was seized or is to be
seized. The complaint shall be filed in the circuit
or district court if the property is not real property and the value is less than $10,000. The complaint shall be filed in the district court if the
value of property other than real property is
$10,000 or more or the property is real property.
If the camplaisvt include* property \u&der the jurisdiction of the circuit court and also property
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the district
court, the complaint shall be filed in the district
court The complaint shall describe with reasonable particularity:
(i) the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known;
and
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(iii) the allegations which constitute a basis for forfeiture.
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the
court shall forthwith issue a warrant for seizure
of the property which is the subject matter of the
action and deliver it to the sheriff for service,
unless the property has previously been seized
without a warrant under Subsection 58-37-13(2).
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the county clerk, and
served together with a copy of the complaint,
upon all persons known to the county attorney or
district attorney to have a claim in the property
by one of the following methods:
(i) upon each claimant whose name and
address is known, at the last-known address
of the claimant, or upon each owner whose
right, title, or interest is of record in the Division of Motor Vehicles, by mailing a copy
of the notice and complaint by certified mail
to the address given upon the records of the
division, which service is considered complete even though the mail is refused or cannot be forwarded; and
(ii) upon all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who are believed
to have an interest in the property, by one
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the seizure was
made.
(d) Except under Subsection (8)(c), any claimant or interested party shall file with the court a
verified answer to the complaint within 20 days
after service has been obtained.
(e) When property is seized under this chapter,
any interested person or claimant of the property, prior to being served with a complaint under this section, may file a petition in the court
having jurisdiction for release of his interest in
the property. The petition shall specify the claimant's interest in the property and his right to
have it released. A copy shall be served upon the
county attorney or, if within a prosecution district, the district attorney in the county of the
seizure, who shall answer the petition within 20
days. A petitioner need not answer a complaint of
forfeiture.
(f) After 20 days following service of a complaint or petition for release, the court shall examine the record and if no answer is on file, the
court shall allow the complainant or petitioner
an opportunity to present evidence in support of
his claim and order forfeiture or release of the
property as the court determines. If the county
attorney or district attorney has not filed an answer to a petition for release and the court determinesfromthe evidence that the petitioner is not
entitled to recovery of the property, it shall enter
an order directing the county attorney or district
attorney to answer the petition within ten days.
If no answer is filed within that period, the court
•hall order the release of the property to the petitioner entitled to receive i t
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition
appears of record at the end of 20 days, the court
shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days.
At this hearing all interested parties may
present evidence of their rights of release of the
property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the case and
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order forfeiture or release of the property as it
determines.
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent
of any other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under this chapter or the laws of this state,
(i) When the court determines that claimants
have no right in the property in whole or in part,
it shall declare the property to be forfeited and
direct it to be delivered to the custody of the Division of Finance. The division shall dispose of the
property under Subsection (8).
(j) When the court determines that property,
in whole or in part, is not subject to forfeiture, it
•hall order release of the property to the proper
claimant. If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture and release in part, it
•hall order partial release and partial forfeiture.
When the property cannot be divided for partial
forfeiture and release, the court shall order it
•old and the proceeds distributed:
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants;
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure, storage of the property, legal costs of filing and pursuing the
forfeiture, and costs of sale; and
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for
the General Fund,
(k) In a proceeding under this section where
forfeiture is declared, in whole or in part, the
court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture proceeding, including seizure and storage of the
property, against the individual or individuals
whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and
may assess costs against any other claimant or
claimants to the property as appropriate.
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68-37-14. Resort for illegal use or possession of
controlled substances deemed common nuisance — District court power
to suppress and enjoin.
(1) Any store, shop, warehouse, dwelling house,
building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place to
which users or possessors of any controlled substances, listed in schedules I through V, resort or
where use or possession of any substances violates
this act, or which is used for illegal keeping, storing,
or selling any substances listed as controlled substances in schedules I through V shall be deemed a
common nuisance. No person shall open, keep, or
maintain any such place.
(2) The district court has the power to make any
order necessary or reasonable to suppress any nuisance and to enjoin any person or persons from doing
any act calculated to cause, or permit the continuation of a nuisance.
is?i
68-37-15. Burden of proof in proceedings on violations — Enforcement officers exempt from liability.
(1) It is not necessary for the state to negate any
exemption or exception set forth in this act in any
complaint, information, indictment or other pleading
or trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this act,
and the burden of proof of any exemption or exception
is upon the person claiming its benefit.
(2) In absence of proof that a person is the duly
authorized holder of an appropriate license, registration, order form, or prescription issued under this act,
he shall be presumed not to be the holder of a license,
registration, order form, or prescription, and the burden of proof is upon him to rebut the presumption.
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abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any
one or more of the jurors have been induced to
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the
court, by resort to a determination by chance or
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for
the party making the application, which he could
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial
shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry
of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1),
(2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit.
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be
served may be extended for an additional period not
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The
court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days
after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative
may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party,
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served
not later than 10 day6 after entry of the judgment.
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors
therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if
any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected
with leave of the appellate court
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect;
newly discovered evidence; fraud, e t c On motion
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for
any cause, the summons in an action has not been
personally served upon the defendant as required by
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
•aid action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment

464

has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3),
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
Rule 61. Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment.
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment Execution or
other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue
immediately upon the entry of the judgment, unless
the court in its discretion and on such conditions for
the security of the adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs.
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment In its discretion and on such conditions for the
security of the adverse party as are proper, the court
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the disposition of a motion
for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made
pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relieffroma
judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for
a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a
motion for amendment to the findings or for additional findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b). ~*;
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal
is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment
granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the
court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore,
or grant an injunction during the pendency of the
appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper for
the security of the rights of the adverse party.
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken
the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited
by law or these rules. The bond may be given at or
after the time of filing the notice of appeal. The stay
is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by
the court.
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof.
When an appeal is taken by the United States, the
state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by
direction of any department of either, and the operation or enforcement of the judgment is stayed, no
bond, obligation, or other security shall be required
from the appellant.

Addendum B
Judgment of forfeiture

WILLIAM L. BENGE, #0282
Grand County Attorney
125 East Center Street
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: 801-259-1324

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County
PILED
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CLERK OF THE COURT
r v •%!••.«

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
No. 9407-059

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE

vs.
SIXTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS,
($16,000.00),
UNITED STATES CURRENCY,
Defendant.

This matter having been submitted to the Court at a
hearing on January 25, 1995, before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson,
District Court Judge, and the Court having duly entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
currency, described in the Complaint on file herein, be, and is
hereby adjudged forfeited to the State of Utah in accordance with
the provisions of Section 58-37-13(g), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
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amended, and that the defendant currency be disposed of according
to the provisions of said section.
DATED this

day of January, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

Ly^^R. Anderson
District Court Judge
William L. Benge
Grand County Attorney
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